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1 Introduction
Many interesting questions concerning public policy in economics requires
developing a class of models that allow for the possibility of violations of
the second welfare theorem of Arrow and Debreu. For example in the en-
dogenous growth literature, the role of human capital is often stressed as
being central to explaining the di¤erences in long run growth rates among
developed countries. Central to such analysis is a failure of markets to in-
corporate external e¤ects into the private decisions of agents concerning the
accumulation of human capital. Unfortunately, this interesting character-
istic of human capital (as in the seminal work in Romer [38] for example)
implies that the second welfare theorem becomes useless. As a consequence,
questions concerning the existence and the characterization of competitive
equilibrium becomes complicated to address. Similarly, a signi…cant part
of the research in public …nance and monetary theory is developing models
where …scal and monetary agents can play an active role in determining the
equilibrium dynamics governing capital accumulation, investment, consump-
tion and output. However, in models with public taxation and distortionary
monetary policy (e.g., the many references to models in Lucas and Stokey
[31], Coleman [14] [15] [16] and Greenwood and Hu¤man [25]), equilibrium
is again nonoptimal, another example of the failure of the “Negishi” based
methods based upon the second welfare theorem.1
In this survey, we discuss an emerging class of methods, which we iden-
tify as the “monotone map methods”, …rst pioneered in the work of Coleman
[14], but which relevance to more general environments has been demon-
strated in the more recent work of Greenwood and Hu¤man [25], Coleman
[15],[16], Datta, Mirman, and Re¤ett [18], and Datta, Mirman, Morand, and
Re¤ett [19] [33], that integrate Negishi type approaches with the existence
and characterization of competitive equilibrium. These methods are power-
ful, and are based upon some important results developed in the literature
in mathematics and operations studying …xed point of operators on partially
ordered spaces. Results in this literature vary from primarily topological
as in the work of Krasnoselskii [29] [30], and Amann [5], to lattice based
as in the work of Tarski [47] , Topkis [51] [52], Vives [55] and Zhou [56].
Although some of the methods are topological, and often require the under-
1See Kehoe [28] for an excellent survey of the so called Negishi approach to these
problems.
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lying domain of the continuous compact operators to be subsets of partially
ordered Banach spaces with particularly desirable properties, other methods
are primarily lattice based and require very little (if anything) concerning the
continuity of operators, but necessitates very strong completeness properties
for the underlying domains of the operators. What is very interesting about
these monotone methods (whether topological or lattice based), and what
is unlike methods based upon …xed point theorems by Brouwer, Schauder,
or Fan-Glicksberg, is that they are constructive and can therefore be used
as the basis for a systematic study of the theoretical properties of numer-
ical methods that are generally used in the applied literature to compute
numerical solutions to such models. This paper focuses primarily on such
order-based constructions, and shows how to related these approaches to re-
cent studies concerning the numerical accuracy of simulation methods for
nonoptimal models to similar versions of such arguments developed for the
Pareto optimal models considered in Santos [44]. In this paper, the possi-
bility of extending the work of Santos [44] appears to hinge critically on the
smoothness of equilibrium in strongly concave environments.
We begin the paper by considering a class of nonoptimal environments
that are basically versions of the models studied in the work of Brock and
Mirman [13] (e.g., single sector production, identical agents, uncertainty, ra-
tional expectations, inelastic labor supply) amended to allow for possible
violations of the second welfare theorem (e.g., situations where there are
taxes, distortionary monetary policy, and/or production externalities asso-
ciated with capital accumulation). These are the prototype models consid-
ered in Coleman [14] and Greenwood and Hu¤man [25]. We …rst present the
monotone map methods that are typically used in the existing literature that
are built around equilibrium versions of the household’s Euler equations (as
in Coleman [14]). We then develop a new monotone map approach which
is not based upon equilibrium Euler equations, but where the operator is
de…ned from the Bellman’s equation and generate a sequence that has …xed
points on a complete lattice of functions. This operator is related to those
in the existing literature but also use information about the value function
to obtain additional characterizations of the equilibrium that are not avail-
abe using a pure Euler equation approach. In our discussion, we also show
how to develop an alternative version of the monotone map procedure that
does not involve any smoothness considerations (e.g., we do not use Euler
equations). This new method is developed in a recent paper of Mirman,
Morand, and Re¤ett [33]. We conclude by discussing how to extend the
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methods discussed in the paper to models with more general speci…cations of
the models primitive economic data. In particular, we consider models with
endogenous labor supply and models that allow for unbounded equilibrium
growth.
In economies where the second welfare theorem applies, the important
works of Amir, Mirman, and Perkins [3], Hopenhayn and Prescott [26], and
Amir [4] provides some results on the application of lattice methods to the
problems of existence, uniqueness, and characterization of the decentralized
equilibrium, and represent an alternative approach to the research program
based on di¤erential topological methods pioneered in the work of Balasko
[7] [8], Araujo and Scheinkman [6], and Santos [41]. Since much of work
bin comparative analysis in macroeconomics requires economic environments
where the second welfare theorem does not hold, this paper identi…es how
lattice methods can be used to studiy existence, uniqueness and comparative
analysis in many distorted environments.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the second section of the
paper we discuss the methods of Coleman [14] and Greenwood and Hu¤man
[25]. In section three we present an alternative monotone map method based
upon the properties of the best response map of each agent, to construct an
operator directly from Bellman’s equation that exploits the supermodularity
properties of the environment. We then compare the two methods. We
show that, as opposed to the topological constructions that underlie the
approachs in Coleman [14][16], the analysis of operators constructed from the
best response mapping relies only upon the order structure and properties of
a set of functions, and that we can directly apply Tarski’s …xpoint theorem
to a complete lattice of functions. In this sense, our work generalizes some
of the results in Hopenhaym and Prescott [26]. Section four shows how the
methods of Coleman [14] can be extended to models with unbounded growth
and endogenous labor supply, and Section …ve concludes.
2 An Euler Equation Method for a Smooth
Strongly Concave Environment
2.1 Taste, Technology and Distortion
For each period and state, the preferences are represented by a monotone,
continuous period utility index u(ci), where ci 2 K ½R+ is period i consump-
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tion. Letting µi = (µ1; :::; µi) denote the history of the shocks until period i,
a household’s lifetime preferences are de…ned over in…nite sequences indexed
by dates and histories c = (cµi) and are given by:
U (c) = Eo
( 1X
i=0
¯iu(ci)
)
where the summation is with respect to the probability structure of future
histories of the shocks µi given the history of shocks, the transition matrix Â
representing the stochastic process of shocks, and the optimal plans up to a
given date i. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The function u : K 7! R is bounded, twice continuously
di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, u00(c) < 0;and bounded
away from zero. In addition, u0(c) satis…es the standard Inada conditions:
lim
c!o
u0(c) =1 and lim
c!1
u0(c) = 0:
Each period, households are endowed with a unit of time which they sup-
ply inelastically to competitive …rms. With the capital-labor ratio denoted
by k; and the per capita counterpart of this measurement by K, we as-
sume that the production possibilities facing the household are summarized
by a function f (k;K; z; t) where t 2 T, T the set of continuous functions
non-decreasing in their arguments, and is thus a closed sublattice in the Ba-
nach lattice of continuous functions with the standard topology of uniform
convergence induced by the Sup norm (denoted the C0 topology). HERE
We restrict the shock process so that the operation of integration preserve
increasing di¤erences, as in Hopenhaym and Prescott: [26]
Assumption 1’: The transition function Â(z; dz0) in an increasing tran-
sition function.
Assumption 2. The function f satis…es the following conditions:
(i). f(0; K; z; t) = 0 for all K 2 K; z 2 Z and t 2 T.
(ii). f is uniformely continuous, twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave in its …rst argument, and the partial derivative
with respect to the …rst variable f1 bounded away from zero.
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Assumption 3. There exist k^(z) > 0 such that f(k^(z); K; z; t) + (1 ¡
±)k^(z) = k^(z) and f(k;K; z; t) < k for all k > k^(z) and for all z 2 Z.2
Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard in the literature. These assumptions
jointly imply that the utility function v(k; k0; z) = u[f(k;K; z; t) ¡ k0] is
strongly concave in (k; k0) in the sense of Montrucchio [?] for each (K; z; ¿).
Assumption 3 is a standard feature in stochastic growth literature (See Brock
and Mirman [13]), and implies that ¹k = supzk^(z) exists. As a consequence,
the state space for the endogeneous variable k (and for output) can be de…ned
on the compact set K = [0; ¹k]: Note that since the domain of f is compact,
uniform continuity is implied by continuity.
The parameter vector t may represent the actions of a government and
can be interpreted in many ways. For instance, in an economy with only a
state contingent capital income tax (as in Coleman [14]), one can rewrite the
modi…ed technology as follows:
f(k;K; z; t) = (1¡ t1(K; z))g(k; z) + t2(K; z)
where g is the undistorted production function, t1(K; z) : S! [0; 1]; and
t2(K;z) is interpreted as a lump sum transfer. If we de…ne the standard
lexicographic partial order on T as t0(K; z) º t(K;z) if and only if either
t
0
1(K;z) < t1(K; z) for all (K; z) 2 S, or t01(K; z) = t1(K;z) and t02(K; z) ¸
t2(K;z), then f(k;K; z; t) is increasing in t:3 Many other cases of distorted
economies can be handled within this language under a similar interpretation.
In all cases, the government budget at equilibrium is such that the revenues
exactly match the expenditures.
The dynamic decision problem for the household is simple. The aggregate
states for the economy, denoted S, belong to the product space S = K£ Z,
and since each representative household enters a period with an individual
stock of capital, k; the state variables for the household are represented by
2These restrictions on preferences and technology in Assumptions 1 and 2 are made
to operationalize the Euler equation approach developed in the next section, and they
conform with the standard assumptions made in the stochastic growth literature (e.g.,
Brock and Mirman [13]. It is well-known that weaker Inada type conditions are possible
on both u and f which are su¢cient to guarantee that policies in equilibrium as interior.
For more discussion, see later part of our paper.
3Finally, because of the dimensionality of the parameter space, we assume that T is
a closed pointwise compact subset of a Banach lattice of continuous functions C(K; z)
which is endowed with the standard pointwise partial order and C0 uniform topology. It
is therefore a complete lattice (i.e., compact in the interval topology of Frink [24]).
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the vector s 2 K£ S. For a given t 2 T we de…ne the household’s feasible
correspondence ¡(k;K; z; t) for the distorted economy as the set of actions
(c; k0) satisfying the following constraints:
c+ k0 = f(k;K; z; t); and c; k0 ¸ 0
Under Assumption 1, ¡(k;K; z; t) is a well-behaved correspondence for each
(k;K; z), t 2 T. In particular, since f and t are assumed to be continuous,
¨ is a non-empty, compact and convex-valued, continuous correspondence
for each state s = (k;K; z). Also, since the distortions are such that t is
increasing in K, for each z, the correspondence is expanding in (k;K): The
correspondence is also expanding in t 2 T; i.e., for t0 ¸ t in the partial order
structure on T, ¡(k;K; z; t) µ ¡(k;K; z; t0) for all (k;K; z): In addition, we
assume that households consider that the per capita capital stock evolves
according to:
K 0 = ·(K;z; t)
where for any given t, ·(:; :; t) : K£ Z! K is continuous in its arguments.
The household solves the dynamic decision problem that is summarized
in terms of the Bellman equation:
J(s) = sup
(c;k0)2¡(s;t)
fu(c) + ¯
Z
Z
J(s0)Â(z; dz0)g (1)
Standard arguments show the existence a J 2 V that satis…es this functional
equation for each ¾, where V is the space of bounded, continuous real valued
functions with the sup norm (see, for instance, Stokey, Lucas and Prescott
[46]). In addition, standard arguments also establish that J is strictly concave
in k. Following arguments in Mirman and Zilcha [37], the concavity of J
also implies that J is once di¤erentiable in k.
We are now prepared to de…ne equilibrium.
De…nition. A (recursive) competitive equilibrium for this economy con-
sists of a function t; a value function for the household J(s); and the associ-
ated individual decisions c and k0 such that: (i) J(s) satis…es the household’s
Bellman equation (1), and c; k0 solve the optimization problem in the Bell-
man’s equation given t; (ii) all markets clear: i.e., k0 = ·(S) = K 0and (iii)
the government budget equilibrates.4
4This last condition t1F = t2 in our example of distortion following Coleman ([14]).
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2.2 Existence of Equilibrium
Recalling that the parameter t 2 T might represent a distortionary equilib-
rium, we cannot construct an equilibrium solution that is based upon the
second welfare theorem. We adopt an alternative strategy, which we name
an “Euler equation approach”,5 and construct an equilibrium by iterating
on an operator based on the household’s decision problems. Speci…cally, we
look for a …xed point of an monotone operator de…ned implicitly in the Euler
equation on the space of policy functions. Recalling that an operator A on
a partially ordered set (X;¸) is said to be a monotone operator if h0 ¸ h
implies Ah0 ¸ Ah for all (h; h0) 2 X, we remind the reader of Tarski’s …xed
point theorem:
Theorem 1 Veinott [54]. Let (X;¸) be a complete lattice, and A : X !
X a monotone increasing mapping. Then the set of …xed point of A is a
non-empty complete lattice.
More precise characterizations of the set of …xed points can be obtained,
but they require establishing more properties of the mapping A. In partic-
ular, we will be using the following version of Tarski’s …xpoint theorem:
Theorem 2 Knaster-Tarski …xed point theorem ([17]). Let (X;¸) be
a partially ordered set with the property that every countable chain in X has
a supremum and an in…mum. Let A : X ! X be monotone and continuous,
and assume that there exists some (a; b) in X2 with A(a) ¸ a and A(b) · b.
Then f has a …xed point and An(a) converges to a minimal …xed point in the
set [a; b] and An(b) converges to a maximal …xed point in the set [a; b].
The …rst operator we use is borrowed from Coleman [14] and is used
to prove existence of equilibrium. Unfortunately, as shown in Coleman,
this operator can be shown to have desirable concave properties only for
for speci…c environment (i.e., CES utility) and therefore cannot be used to
establish uniqueness in the most general setup. usingwe are not able to
use the same operator for our second result, the uniqueness of equilibrium.
However, we develop a second operator, similar to the operator studied in
5This is in contrast to the “value function” or the “Bellman equation” approach, in
which one looks for a …xed point of the Bellman’s operator in the space of value functions.
In a non-smooth environment, the Bellman equation approach is useful while the Euler
equation approach need not be.
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Coleman [16], which …xed points coincide with the …xed points of the …rst
operator, and we show that the second operator has at most one …xed point.
This same line of argument is developed for a model with labor-leisure choice
in Datta, Mirman and Re¤ett [18].
The Euler equation associated with the optimal policy function from the
right side of the Bellman equation in (1) (after appealing to the envelope
condition) is:
u0(c) = ¯
Z
£
u0[c(f ¡ c; z0)]r(f ¡ c; z0)Â(z; dz0): (2)
in which we omit the arguments in each function for simplicity. Consider
the space, denoted H0+, of consumption functions h such that:
(i). h : S! K and h continuous;
(ii). 0 · h(k; z) · f(K;K; z; ¿ ) for all (k; z) 2 S;
(iii). 0 · h(k0; z)¡ h(k; z) · f (k0; k0; z; ¿)¡ f(k; k; z; ¿ ) for all k0 ¸ k:
Equip H0+ with the standard uniform C0 topology and the partial order
¸ de…ned as h0 ¸ h if and only if h0(S) ¸ h(S) for all S 2 S. Notice that
condition (iii) imposes that both h and f¡h be increasing, and implies some
very important properties for H0+.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1 and 2:
1. The set H0+ is an equicontinuous set of function;
2. Every monotone sequence of elements of H0+ converges pointwise to
an element of H0+;
3. The convergence is uniform on any compact subset of the state space;
4. With the additional Assumption 3, the set H0+ is compact in the
uniform topology.
Proof: (1). Equicontinuity is here induced by the double monotonicity
in (iii) of the elements of H0+ in conjunction with the uniform continuity
of F (k; z) = f (k; k; z). The assumption of uniform continuity of F on its
domain implies that:
8" > 0; 9± > 0 jk ¡ k0j < ± =) jF (k0; z)¡ F (k; z)j < "
For all h in H0+; properties (iii) writes: For all k0 ¸ k;
0 · h(k0; z)¡ h(k; z) · F (k0; z)¡ F (k; z)
8
Combining this last inequality with the uniform continuity of F leads to:
8" > 0; 9± > 0 jk ¡ k0j < ± =) 8c in H0+, jh(k0; z)¡ h(k; z)j < "
which demonstrates that H0+ is an equicontinuous set of functions. Notice
that this result does not require compactness of the state space S.
(2) and (3). As a consequence, the Azerla-Ascoli theorem (See Royden
[39]) applies: Each sequence fgng1n=0 of elements of H0+, because the closure
of the set fgn(k; z) : 0 · n < 1g is necessarily compact since by de…nition
0 · gn(k; z) · f(k; k; z; ¿), therefore has a subsequence that converges to-
ward a continuous function g, and the convergence is uniform on compact
subset of S. It is easy to see that if the sequence fgng1n=0 is monotone,
then the whole sequence converges pointwise to the limit of the convergent
subsequence, denoted g. Moreover, because all gn and f ¡ gn are increasing,
g and f ¡ g are also increasing, in addition to being continuous and in the
set [0; f ]. Consequently, g belongs to H0+.
(4). Assumption 3 implies that the state space is compact, and the
Azerla-Ascoli therefore implies that H0+ is compact in the topology induced
by the Sup norm (i.e., the uniform topology).
The nonlinear operator A on H0+ (it will be shown later that A maps H0+
inot itself) is de…ned implicitly as the zero of the following operator Z:
Z(h; ~h; k; z; ¿ ) = ª1(~h)¡ª2(h; ~h; k; z; ¿ );
where,
ª1 = u
0(~h)
and:
ª2 = ¯
Z
Z
u0(h(f ¡ ~h; z0); z0)r(f ¡ ~h; z0; ¿ )Â(z; dz0):
That is, the operator A is de…ned as:
A(h; ¿ ) = f~h : Z(h; ~h; k; z; ¿ ) = 0 for h > 0 and ~h = 0 for h = 0g:
The following lemma lists key properties of the operator A:
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Lemma 4 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3:
1. For any h 2 H0+, there exists a unique Ah for all (k; z) such that
Z(h;Ah; k; z; ¿ ) = 0.
2. A is a self map or, A : H0+! H0+.
3. A is a continuous operator on H0+;
4. A is a monotone operator on H0+.
5. There exists a maximal …xed point Ah¤ 2 H0+ such that limn!1Anf !
Ah¤ uniformly.
6. The maximal …xed point is strictly positive.
Proof: The proofs of (1), (2), (3), (4) are in Coleman [14]. It is important
to note that neither (1), (2), nor (4) rely on compactness of the state space,
and are therefore true under Assumption 1 and 2 only. Part (5) follows
from the version of Tarski theorem stated at the beginning of the section,
noticing that compact H0+and from the previous proposition. Notice that
Tarski theorem does not rule out the possibility for the zero consumption
to be the only …xed point of A. However, it is easy to show that the zero
consumption plan is not optimal, a feature of the model that relies crucially
on the assumption of unbounded marginal utility at zero. Coleman [14]
proves Part (6) under some restriction of the shocks while Greenwood and
Hu¤man [25] provides a more general proof of the strict positivity of the
maximal …xed point.6
We can now state our existence result.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1-3, there exists an equilibrium.
2.3 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Coleman [14] establishes the uniqueness of the …xed point of the mapping
A by restricting the utility function (see, assumption 7).7 In this paper,
we demonstrate uniqueness for the general class of utility function satisfying
Assumption 1 by introducing another operator, denoted bA, and show that bA
is a pseudo concave and x0-monotone operator.
6Some of these properties are true under Assumption 1-2 only, which will be addressed
in Subsection 2.3.
7Actually Coleman’s [14] construction can be generalized to the case of constant ab-
solute risk aversion in addition to constant relative risk aversion by using a very similar
construction.
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De…nition. An operator bA on H0+ is pseudo concave if for any strictly
positive function c in H0+, any 0 < t < 1, and for all (k; z) 2 S, ( bAtc)(k; z) >
t( bAc)(k; z).
De…nition. An operator bA on H0+ is x0-monotone if it is monotone
and if for any strictly …xed point c1 of bA there exists some k0 > 0 such that
the following is true: For any 0 · k1 · k0 and any c2 2 H0+ such that
c1(k; z) ¸ c2(k; z), c1(k; z) ¸ ( bAc2)(k; z) for all k ¸ k1 and all z.
Theorem 6 [14] An operator bA that is pseudo concave and x0-monotone
has at most one strictly …xed point.
We construct the operator bA as follows. First de…ne the set of functions,
denoted M and endowed with the standard partial pointwise order, m :
R+ ¤ Z ! R such that:
(i). m is continuous,
(ii). For all (K; z) 2 R+ ¤ Z, 0 · m(K;z) · F (K; z)
(iii). For any K = 0, m(K; z) = 0:
For any m 2M , consider the function ª(m(K; z)) implicitly de…ned by:
u0[ª(m(K; z))] = 1=m(K; z) for m > 0, 0 elsewhere
Clearly,ª is continuous, increasing, limm!0ª(m) = 0, and limm!F (K;z)ª(m) =
F (K;z): Using the function ª, we denote:
bZ(m; em;K; z) = 1=em
¡
¯Ezf[H(F (K; z)¡ª(em(K; z)); z0)]=[m(F (K; z)¡ª(em(K; z)); z0)]g
and consider the operator bA:
bA(m) = fem = bZ(m; em;K; z) = 0 for m > 0, 0 elsewhereg
Since bZ is strictly increasing in m and strictly decreasing in em, and since
limem!0 bZ = +1 and lim em!F (K;z) bZ = ¡1, for each m(K; z) > 0;with
K > 0; and z 2 Z there exists a unique bAm(K; z).
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It is easy to show that to each …xed point of the operator A corresponds
a …xed point of the operator bA: Indeed, consider x such that Ax = x and
de…ne y = 1=u0(x) (or, equivalently ª(y) = x). By de…nition, x satis…es:
u0(x(K; z)) = ¯EzfH(F (K; z)¡ x(K; z); z0) ¤ u0(x(F (K; z)¡ x(k; z); z0))g
for all (K; z). Substituting the de…nition of y into this expression, this
implies that:
1=y = ¯Ezf[H(F (K; z)¡ª(y(K; z)); z0)]=[y(F (K; z)¡ª(y(k; z); z0))g
which shows that y is a …xed point of bA.
Lemma 7 The operator bA is pseudo concave and x0-monotone, and there-
fore has at most one strictly positive …xed point.
Proof: Recall that bA is pseudo concave if, for any strictly positive m and
any 0 < t < 1, bAtm(K; z) > t bAm(K; z) for all K > 0 and for all z 2 Z.
Since bZ is strictly decreasing in its second argument, a su¢cient condition
for this to be true is that:
bZ(tm; t bAm;K; z) > bZ(tm; bAtm;K; z) = 0 (3)
By de…nition:
bZ(tm; t bAm;K; z) = 1=t bAm
¡
¯Ezf[H(F (K; z)¡ª(t bAm(K; z)); z0)]=[tm(F (K; z)¡ª(t bAm(K; z)); z0)]g
so that:
t bZ(tm; t bAm;K; z) = 1= bAm
12
¡¯Ezf[H(F (K; z)¡ª(t bAm(K;z)); z0)]=[m(F (K; z)¡ª(t bAm(K; z)); z0)]g
Since ª is increasing and H(K 0; z0)=m(K 0; z0) is decreasing in K 0:
1= bAm¡ ¯Ezf[H(F (K; z)¡ª(t bAm(K; z)); z0)]=[m(F (K; z)¡ª(t bAm(K;z)); z0)]g
>
1= bAm¡ ¯Ezf[H(F (K; z)¡ª( bAm(K; z)); z0)]=[m(F (K; z)¡ª( bAm(K; z)); z0)]g = 0
and bZ(tm; t bAm;K; z) > 0 so that condition (3) obtains.
The condition that limk!0 f1(k;K; z) =1 for all K > 0, all z in Assump-
tion 1 (ii) implies thatH(0; z0) =1 for all z0. Given that bA is monotone, this
latter condition is su¢cient for the operator bA to be x0-monotone (Lemma
9 and 10 in Coleman [14]).
All …xed points of A - and at least one of them is strictly positive - are
also …xed points of bA, which has at most one …xed point. Thus, necessarily,
the strictly …xed point of A is unique, and we can state our existence result.
Proposition 8 Under Assumption 1-3, there exists a unique strictly positive
equilibrium.
3 A Value Function Iteration Method
In this section we relax some of the smoothness restrictions on the primitives
assumed in the previous sections, and appeal to supermodularity and lattice
theoretic methods to prove existence of and to characterize the equilibrium.
The new set of assumptions encompasses a larger set of environments that the
one considered before, although our analysis also applies to the setup of the
previous section. However, abandonning the assumption of di¤erentiability
and smoothness implies that we cannot work with the Euler equation, and
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that we have to build a method straigth from the Bellman’s equation. We
show how the seminal work of Hopenhayn and Prescott [26] can be applied to
distorted economies and can be build upon to show existence of equilibrium
in distorted setups and to begin characterize the dependence of equilibrium
on the distortion.
Mirman, Morand and Re¤ett (2001) pushes the analysis further and show
that these methods can be generalized to distorted setups in which the strict
concavity assumptions on the primitives is also relaxed. However, in such
setups the analysis is complicated by the fact that the optimal policy is not
longer a one-to-one mapping, but a correspondence. Nevertheless, Mirman,
Morand and Re¤ett (2001) generate existence and characterization results
by constructing an argument based on a generalization of Tarski’s …xpoint
theorem to correspondences.
For the rest of this section, we make the following assumptions on the
primitives of taste and technology:
Assumption 4. The primitive economic data satisfy the following:
(i) period utility index u : K 7! R is bounded, continuous, strictly con-
cave, and strictly increasing in c;
(ii) For any t 2 T, the production function f (:; t) : K£K£Z is continu-
ous and non-decreasing in all of its arguments, and satis…es f(0; K; z; t) = 0
for all (K; z; t) 2 K £ Z £ T;
(iii) there exist k^(z; t) > 0 such that f (k^(z; t); k^(z; t); z; t)+(1¡±)k^(z; t) =
k^(z; t) and f (k; k; z; t) < k for all k > k^(z; t) for all z 2 Z and t 2 T;
(iv) the period utility index u, the production function f; and the pa-
rameter t 2 T are such that ¨(y; k;K; z; t(K;z)) = u(f(k;K; z; t) ¡ y) is
supermodular in (x; y) where x = (k; t) for each (K; z):
First, notice that supermodularity and the property of having increasing
di¤erences are equivalent properties for functions de…ned on compact do-
mains that are products of closed intervals of R; and therefore lattices. This
is the case in the rest of the paper, and we therefore use the terms “increas-
ing di¤erences” and “supermodularity” equivalently. Second, the following
lemma is a consequence of Assumption 4(i) and (ii).
Lemma 9 The function ¨(y; k;K; z; t(K; z)) is strictly supermodular in (x0; y)
where x0 = (k;K) given any (z; t).
Proof. By Assumption 4(ii) f is non-decreasing in all its arguments
so that f(k0; K 0; z; t) ¸ f (k;K; z; t) whenever (k0; K 0) ¸ (k;K); this last
inequality being in the pointwise partial order on R2. Consequently:
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u(f(k0; K 0; z; t)¡ y)¡ u(f(k;K; z; t)¡ y)
is strictly increasing in y since u is strictly concave by Assumption 4(i). This
establishes that ¨(y; k;K; z; t(K; z)) has increasing di¤erences in (x; y) where
x = (k;K), which is equivalent to supermodularity.
Finally, we also to restrict the shock process so that the operation of inte-
gration (or more literally summation in our case) perserves supermodularity,
and therefore follow Hopenhayn and Prescott [26] by imposing the following
restriction:
Assumption 5: The transition function Â(z; dz0) in an increasing tran-
sition function.
Although Assumption 4 (i) requires strict concavity of the period utility
index and, together with Assumption 4 (ii), implies strict supermodularity of
¨, our existence result only requires that ¨ be supermodular and therefore
holds under the weaker assumption of concavity of u.
3.1 The Household Decision Problem
For a given t 2 T the household’s feasible correspondence ¡(k;K; z; t) is the
set of actions (c; k0) satisfying the following constraints:
c+ k0 = f(k;K; z; t); and c; k0 ¸ 0
and is a well-behaved correspondence for each (k;K; z), t 2 T under Assump-
tion 1. In particular, since f and t are assumed to be continuous, ¨ is a
non-empty, compact and convex-valued, continuous correspondence for each
state s = (k;K; z). Also, since t is increasing in K , the correspondence is
expanding in (k;K): The correspondence is also expanding in t 2 T; i.e., for
t0 ¸ t in the pointwise order structure on T , ¡(k;K; z; t) µ ¡(k;K; z; t0) for
all (k;K; z):
To complete the description of the aggregate economy, we assume that
households take as given the following recursion on the per-capita aggregate
capital stock K:
K 0 = h(K; z)
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where h 2 C1 ½ C and C is the set of bounded functions de…ned on a
compact S, and C1 is a subset of C for which we also require h to be socially
feasible, i.e., for each t 2 T; 0 · h(K; z) · f(K;K; z; t) for all (K; z); and
non-decreasing in its …rst argument for each z; i.e., h(K 0; z) ¡ h(K; z) ¸ 0
when K 0 ¸ K. Equipped with the Sup norm and the standard pointwise
order structure, C1 is a subset of the Banach lattice C of bounded functions
de…ned on S. Notice that we do not require h to be continuous: Indeed,
we placed no restrictions other than continuity and monotonicity on f and
therefore cannot expect that policy function to be continuous.
The following proposition established that su¢cient structure for applying
Tarski-related …xpoint theorems exists.
Proposition 10 C1 is a complete convex sublattice of the Banach lattice of
bounded functions C:
We are now ready to represent the typical household’s decision problem
for a decentralized competitive equilibrium. Consider a household entering
the period in state (k;K; z) for a given h and t. For any given h 2 C1 and
t 2 T, the value function v(k;K; z; t; h) necessarily satis…es:
v(k;K; z; t; h) = sup
c;k02¡(k;K;z;t)
fu(c) + ¯
Z
Z
v(k0; h(K;z); z0; t; h)Â(z; dz0)g (4)
De…ning the operator TC as:
TCv(k;K; z; t; h) = sup
0·y·f(k;K;z;t)
fu(f(k;K; z; t)¡ y)
+¯
Z
Z
v(y; h(K; z); z0; t; h)Â(z; dz0)g
and applying the standard version of the theorem of the maximum (see Berge
[10]) and the contraction mapping theorem, it is easy to show that TC delivers
a unique value function v¤(k;K; z; t; h) for each pair (t; h), as stated in the
following lemma:
Lemma 11 For h 2 C1 and t 2 T; there exists a unique function v¤ bounded,
weakly increasing, concave and continuous in its …rst argument satisfying
Bellman’s functional equation (4).
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Denote:
°(k;K; z; t; h) = fy j y = arg max
0·y·f (k;K;z;t)
fu(f (k;K; z; t)¡ y)
+¯
Z
Z
v¤(y; h(K; z); z0; t; h)Â(z; dz0)g
the optimal policy associated with the value function v¤(k;K; z; t; h). Since
the right hand side in the de…nition of ° is strictly concave in y, the optimal
policy exists for each (k;K; h; t). In addition, the right hand side is also
supermodular in (x; y) where x = (k;K); so that ° is increasing in (k;K) for
each z 2 Z by application of Hopenhayn and Prescott [26], which relies on
an important result in Topkis (see [52], Theorem 2.8.1).
Lemma 12 Given any t 2 T and h 2 C1; under Assumptions 4-5, the value
function v(k;K; z) has an optimal policy °(k;K; z) which is increasing in
(k;K) for each z 2 Z:
3.2 Existence of Equilibrium
Some of the assumptions required to prove of existence in the previous sec-
tion of this paper have been relaxed in this section, so existence has to be
established through a di¤erent path. Our strategy is to construct a non-
linear correspondence A which maps a complete lattice of functions C1 into
itself C1 and to show that this correspondence is monotone increasing on C1
in the pointwise partial order. Since C1 is a lattice, it follows from Tarski’s
theorem that the set of …xed points of A is not empty.8
Speci…cally, for a given h and a given t, we de…ne Ah(t) as the opti-
mal policy along a candidate equilibrium trajectory, that is, we impose the
equilibrium condition k = K in the optimal policy so that:
Ah(K; z) = °(K;K; z; h; t)
This construction de…nes an operator A with the following properties:
8Note that under a more general setup relaxing the assumption of strict concavity,
Zhou (CITE) develops a version of Tarski theorem for correspondence that can be applied
to demonstrate existence of equilibrium (See Mirman, Morand and Re¤ett 2001).
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Lemma 13 Given any t 2 T, under Assumptions 4-5, for any h, Ah(K; z)
2 C1 and A is increasing in h in the partial pointwise order.
The following proposition is then a direct consequence of Tarski’s theorem
previously cited.
Proposition 14 Under Assumption 4-5, the set of equilibrium is a non-
empty complete lattice.
Because a complete lattice is, a fortiori, chain complete, and the opera-
tor A has an excessive point (the zero consumption, which satis…es A0 ¸ 0)
and a de…cient point (the production function, which satis…es Af · f), the
mapping A has a minimal and a maximal …xed point, from Tarksi theorem.
Further developments of these order-based methods also suggest algorithms
to compute the minimal and maximal …xed points, as demonstrated in Mir-
man, Morand and Re¤ett 2001.
Proposition 15 For each t 2 T; the maximal …xed point of the operator
Ah(K; z) can be computed as hu(t) = limn!1Anuf(K;K; z; t).
3.3 Monotone Comparative Analysis
Comparative analysis for this economy discusses how the set of …xed points
E(t) 2 P (C1) of the operator A changes with respect to changes in the
parameter t 2 T. Recall that T is endowed by pointwise partial order. When
comparing the elements of P (C1), we will use the two order relationships that
are de…ned below (See Veinott [54] for a discussion of the ordinal structure
of the various partial orders on P (C1)). Let X be a partially ordered set
and P (X) the power set of X :
(i). Weak induced set order (see Shannon [45] or Topkis [52]): The weak
induced set order on P (X)n;, denoted by ¸w, is such that B ¸w B0 if for
each x 2 B, there exists x0 2 B0 such that x º x0, and for each x0 2 B0 there
exists x 2 B such that x º x0:
(ii). Induced set ordering (discussed in Topkis [52]): The induced set
ordering on P (X)n;, denoted by ¸sin section 2, is such that B ¸s B0 if for
each x 2 X and each x0 2 X 0, x0 ^ x 2 B0 and x0 _ x 2 B.
Clearly, when X is a lattice, the strong order ¸s is a stronger ordering
than the weak order ¸w in the sense that B ¸s B0 implies that B ¸w B0.
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While it is clear that ¸ss implies ¸w and ¸s, we were unable to obtain
su¢cient conditions to generate comparative analysis results in ¸ss :
Our strategy for comparative analysis is simple: We show that A varies
monotonically in the parameter t on T in the weak set order ¸w, as well
as in the strong set order ¸s. This result depends critically on the supre-
modularity property of the return function postulated in Assumption 4 (iv).
Consider the subset of Vt of V of functions v(k;K; z; h; t) that are supermod-
ular in (k; t), and de…ne:
TCv(k;K; z; t) = sup
y
fu(f (k;K; z; t(K; z))¡ y) + ¯
Z
v(y; h(K; z); z0; t)Â(z; dz0)g
The second term on the right side of this equality is supermodular in (y; t)
and therefore in ((k; y); t), while the …rst term is by Assumption 4 (iv) su-
permodular in ((k; y); t) for each (K; z). Consequently:
TCv(k;K; z; t) = sup
y
fH(k;K; y; z; t)g
is supermodular in (k; t) by Topkis ([52], theorem 2.7.6), which proves that
T cVt ½ Vt. Since Vt is a closed subspace of V , then by Corollary 1 of Theo-
rem 3.2 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [46], the value function satisfying the
Bellman’s equation belongs to the subset Vt of V . Consequently, the optimal
policy function °(k;K; z; t) is increasing in (k; t) by a similar argument to
the one developed in Lemma 5. This property provides the basis for the
following result:
Theorem 16 Under Assumptions 4-5, for all t0 ºT t, the set of …xed points
E(t) of the nonlinear operator A satis…es: (i) E(t0) ¸w E(t), and (ii)
E(t0) ¸s E(t) on C1.
4 Extensions
We show that the methods developed in the …rst section of the paper can
be tailored to cover more complex environments. In particular, it is rela-
tively straightforward to show how to relax the assumption of compactness of
the state space (Assumption 3) and still establish existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium for a set of unbounded growth models (Morand and Re¤ett
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2001). Such results …ll an important gap in the existing literature. The
methods also apply to models in which labor is an input to the production of
the consumption good, in addition to capital. However, such a modi…cation
of the production function increases the dimension of the choice set of house-
holds and requires de…ned a more complicated set of functions on which a
monotone increasing operator can be constructed from the Euler equations.
4.1 Unbounded Growth
Existence and uniqueness can also be established in setups in which As-
sumption 3 does not hold, so that growth is unbounded, by using the same
operator A. This type of models encompasses endogenous growth models
with externalities, even when there are no stationary representation as in
Greenwood and Hu¤man [25], provided that utility is bounded.9 The dif-
…culty arises from the fact that the set of functions on which A operates
is much larger than in the compact state space case, since it includes some
unbounded elements. Fortunately, it can be shown that this set still has
su¢cient properties for a …xpoint argument to apply. Speci…cally, the argu-
ment is based on the following …xpoint theorem (for proof of the theorem,
see Morand and Re¤ett [36]):
Theorem 17 Let [y; by] be an order interval of a lattice (E;·); and A :
[y; by] ! [y; by] a continuous and increasing function. If every sequence in
[y; by] has a convergent subsequence that converges to an element in [y; by] then
A has a minimal …xed point x and a maximal …xed point bx. Moreover,
x = limk!1Ak(y) and bx = limk!1Ak(by), and the sequences fAk(y)g1k=0 and
fAk(by)g1k=0 are increasing and decreasing, respectively.
Consider the order interval [y; by] = [0; F ] = H0+, which is an equicontinu-
ous set of functions under the assumption of uniform continuity of F on its
domain. The operator A is a monotone self map (Lemma 4), with AF · F
and A0 ¸ 0, and every sequence of elements of H0+ has a convergent subse-
quence that converges in H0+, so that every monotone sequence is convergent
in H0+, and the convergence is uniform on compact subsets of the state space
(Lemma 3). In particular, denote by bc the limit of the sequence fAk(by)g1k=0.
9When utility is not assumed to be bounded, Alvarez and Stokey (CITE) demonstrate
existence and uniqueness for the class of return functions that are homogeneous of degree
µ · 1:
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Then, if A is continuous, by de…nition of continuity at bc, the equality Abc = bc
is true, and bc (resp. c) are the maximal and minimal …xed points by the
previous theorem.
Thus, the only requirement of Theorem 17 left to be demonstrated is
that the operator A is continuous. If that is the case, continuity at bc implies
that for any sequence fcng converging to bc, the sequence fAcng converges
to Abc. As a consequence, the sequence fAn(by)g which converges to bc will
also converge to Abc, and by uniqueness of the limit, Abc = bc. Continuity
(at bc) is therefore a su¢cient condition for establishing that Abc = bc, but
a far from necessary one, since we are only interested in one particular se-
quence converging to bc. Indeed, it is possible to directly demonstrate that
Abc(K; z) = bc(K; z) without having to …rst prove that A is continuous in bc,
as stated in the following proposition.
Lemma 18 Proposition 19 The limit ec of the sequence fAk(y)g1k=0 is a
…xed point of the operator A, that is, Aec = ec:
Proof. Rearranging the notations, pick any K = (x; y) in R+ ¤ R+ and
consider s = (K; z). Assume, without loss of generality, that x ¸ y. The
sequence fcn+1g1n=0 = fAcng1n=0 converges to ec pointwise, so that:
for all z in Z, F (s)¡ Acn(s) converges to F (s)¡ ec(s)
and, since H is continuous:
for all z in Z, H(F (s)¡ Acn(s)) converges to H(F (s)¡ ec(s))
We also know that the convergence of sequence fcng1n=0 toward ec is uniform on
the compact space Y = [0; F (x; x; zmax)]¤[0; F (x; x; zmax)]¤Z. Consequently:
for all z in Z, cn(F (s)¡ Acn(s)) converges to ec(F (s)¡ ec(s))
Note that the uniform convergence toward ec is essential in establishing this
result. Indeed, for all z:
jcn(F (s)¡ Acn(s))¡ ec(F (s)¡ ec(s))j
·
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jcn(F (s)¡ Acn(s))¡ ec(F (s)¡Acn(s))j
+
jec(F (s)¡ Acn(s))¡ ec(F (s)¡ ec(s))j
The …rst absolute value on the right side of the inequality above is bounded
above by sup jcn ¡ ecj on the compact Y , which can be made abitrarily small
because of the uniform convergence on the compact Y . The second absolute
value can be made arbitrarily small by equicontinuity of ec:
Then, by continuity of u0:
for all z in Z, u0[cn(F (s)¡ Acn(s))] converges to u0[ec(F (s)¡ ec(s))]
Thus:
¯Ezfu0[cn(F (s)¡ Acn(s))]H(F (s)¡Acn(s))g converges to ¯Ezfu0[ec(F (s)¡ ec(s))]H(F (s)¡ ec(s))g
The term on the left is exactly u0(Acn(s)) which we know converges to
u0(ec(s)). By uniqueness of the limit:
u0(ec(s)) = ¯u0[ec(F (s)¡ ec(s))]ec(F (s)¡ ec(s))
which demonstrates that, for all s, Aec(s) = ec(s).
Finally, noting that a completely symmetric reasoning applies for the
sequence de…ned by c0 = y and cn+1 = Acn in which y is a de…cient point,
i.e. Ay · y, we can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 20 Under Assumption 1-2, there exists a maximal …xed point
of A in [0; F ], which can be obtained as the limit of the sequence An(F ).
Uniqueness follows from a similar argument to the one presented before,
exploiting the pseudo concavity and x0-monotonicity of an operator bA.10
10A benign modi…cation of the proof theorem 6 in Section 2 is required.
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4.2 Models with Capital and Elastic Labor Supply
We alter the setting of Section 2 to incorporate elastic labor supply, in ad-
dition to a state contigent wage and capital tax, while also allowing for
production externalities. Many economies …t this notation. Production
still takes place in perfectly competitive markets for both output goods and
the factors of production, but households nowl have preferences de…ned over
both consumption and leisure, so their unit of time will no longer be supplied
inelastically. We therefore alter the assumptions in section two of the paper
so that preferences are now represented by a period utility index u(zt) where
zt = (ct; lt) 2 R+£[0; 1]. Again letting µt = (µ1; :::; µt) denote the history of
the shocks until period t, the households lifetime preferences are additively
separable and de…ned over in…nite sequences indexed by dates and histories
z = (zµt) and are now given as follows
U(z) = Eo
( 1X
t=0
¯tu(zt)
)
:
We now change assumption one given the additional considerations introduce
by de…ning preferences over leisure: the period utility function u : R£[0; 1] 7!
R satis…es the following assumption:
Assumption 6:
(i) The period utility function u is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave in (c; l).
(ii) The partial derivatives uc(c; l) and ul(c; l) satisfy the Inada condi-
tions:
limc!0 uc(c; l) =1; limc!1uc(c; l) = 0; liml!0ul(c; l) =1:
(iii) ucl(c; l) ¸ 0
With the exception of (iii), which is simply normality, these assumptions
on period utility then are standard. (iii) is particularly important in our case,
as we require that the marginal rate of substitution ul
uc
to be non-decreasing
in c and ul
uc
to be non-increasing in l to construct a monotone operator in our
case. However, one should note that Assumption 6 (iii) is not su¢cient to
have the period utility function supermodular in (c; l; k;K).
Each household is endowed with a unit of time, and enters into a period
with an individual stock of capital k: We assume a decentralization where
…rms do not face dynamic decision problems. Households own …rms as well
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as both the factors of production and rent these factors of productions in
competitive markets. In addition, to allow for externalities in the production
process, we assume that the production technologies of the …rms depend on
per capita aggregates. Each period, …rms rent capital k and labor n from
households, sell output goods in competitive markets, and then return all
pro…ts to households at the end of the period. Let f : K£[0; 1]£K£[0; 1]££
summarize the production possibilities for the …rm in any given period, K is
a compact set to be described in more detail later. Technology satis…es the
following assumption:
Assumption 7: The production function satis…es,
(i) f (0; 0; K;N; µ) = 0 for all (K;N; µ) 2 K£ [0; 1]££;
(ii) f (k; n;K;N; µ) is continuous, increasing, di¤erentiable; in addition,
it is concave and homogeneous of degree one in (k; n):
(iii) f (k; n;K;N; µ) also satis…es the standard Inada conditions in (k; n)
for all (K;N; µ) 2 K£[0; 1]££; i.e. :limk!0 fk(k; n;K;N; µ) =1; ; limn!0 fn(k; n;K;N; µ) =
1; ; limk!1 fk(k; n;K;N; µ) = 0 :
(iv) There exists a k^(µ) > 0; such that f(k^(µ); 1; k^(µ); 1; µ)+(1¡±)k^(µ) =
k^(µ) and f (k; 1; k; 1; µ) < k for all k > k^(µ); for all µ 2 £.
Assumption 7 is completely standard in the stochastic growth literature
(c.f., Brock and Mirman [13]). In particular Assumption 7 (iv) implies that
the state space for capital stock and output can be de…ned as the compact
set K = [0; ¹k]:
Assume that …rms maximize pro…ts under perfect competition, and de-
note ¹r(K; µ) the rental rate on capital and ¹w(K; µ) the wage rate. The
factor prices are continuous functions of the aggregate state variable. The
representative …rm’s maximum pro…t is,
¦(¹r; ¹w;K;N; µ) = supk;nf(k; n;K;N; µ) ¡ ¹rk ¡ ¹wn
Anticipating the standard de…nition of competitive equilibrium with k = K
and n = N (S); for S 2 S prices in the factor markets are ¹r = fk and
¹w = fn. Also, given the assumed structure on the …rm’s decision problem,
the Theorem of the Maximum ([10]) implies that ¦ is a continuous function,
and that solutions to the …rm’s problem exist.
The household solves a standard dynamic capital accumulation problem,
which we describe by parametrizing the aggregate economy faced by a typical
decision maker. Again de…ne C to be the space of bounded, continuous
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functions with domain S and range R+. If the aggregate per capita capital
stock is K; then households assume that per capita consumption decisions
C, and per capita labor supply N , and the recursion of the capital stock K 0
are given by,
K 0 = ·(S); C = C(S);N = N(S); C; ·;N 2 C
The aggregate economy thus consists of functions ­ = (w; r; ·; C;N) from
a space of functions with suitable restrictions needed to parameterize the
household’s decision problem in the second-stage. Assume that the policy-
induced equilibrium distortions have the following standard form,
r = [1¡ ¼k(S)]¹r; and w = [1¡ ¼n(S)] ¹w;
where ¼ = [¼k; ¼n] is a continuous mapping S![0; 1) £ [0; 1). We assume
regularity conditions on the distorted prices w and r.
Assumption 8: The vector of distortions ¼ = [¼k; ¼n] is such that the
distorted wage w = (1 ¡ ¼n(K; µ)) ¹w(K;N(K; µ); µ) and the distorted rental
rate r = (1¡ ¼n(K; µ))¹r(K;N (K; µ); µ) satisfy the following:
(i) w : K££! R+ is continuous, at least once-di¤erentiable and (weakly)
increasing in K,
(ii) r : K+ ££! R+ is continuous and decreasing in K such that,
lim
K!0
r(K; µ)!1:
In other words, we assume that the distorted wage and rental rates be-
have geometrically as the non-distorted rates ¹w; ¹r (which are the marginal
products of labor and capital, respectively).
Let the lump-sum transfers to each agent be given by a function d(S) =
¼kK + ¼nN(K; µ), and the household’s total income (taking into account
the elastic nature of labor supply) is therefore given as y(s) = rk + wN +
(1¡ ±)k + ¦; the sum of distorted rental and wage incomes, undepreciated
capital and pro…ts where s is the individual household’s state, s = (k; S) =
(k;K; µ). Note that y(s) is a continuous function. The household’s feasible
correspondence ª(s) for the distorted economy then consists of the set of
(c; k0) 2 R2+ and l 2 [0; 1] that satisfy the following constraint,
c+ w(1¡ l) + k0 = y;
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given (k;K; µ)À 0: Notice that ª(s) is well behaved: In particular, since
¦ is continuous, ª is a non-empty, compact and convex-valued, continuous
correspondence.
Next, we state the decision problem for the household. At the beginning
of any period the aggregate state for the economy is given by S 2 S. Each
household enters the period with their individual capital stock k 2 K , so
their individual state is s 2 K£ S: Then the households dynamic decision
problem is summarized by the Bellman equation,
J(s) = sup(c;l;k0)2ª(s)u(c; l) + ¯
Z
£
J(s0)Â(µ; dµ0)
Standard arguments show the existence a J 2 J that satis…es this functional
equation, where J is the space of bounded, continuous functions with the uni-
form norm. In addition, since u is strictly concave in c, standard arguments
also establish that J is strictly concave in its …rst argument, k. Following
arguments in Mirman and Zilcha [37], the concavity of J also implies that the
envelope theorem applies and J is once di¤erentiable in k. A standard ar-
gument shows that the …rst order conditions for this problem can be written
as
ul(c; l)
uc(c; l)
= (1¡ ¼n(S))fn(K;N; µ): (5)
uc(c; l) = ¯
Z
£
uc(c(K
0; µ0); l(K 0; µ0))r(K 0; µ0)Â(µ; dµ0): (6)
where the 0 notation refers to next period value of the particular variable.
In equilibrium, c(s) = C(S); k = K; n = N(S). The next period capital
stock, in equilibrium, is then written asK 0 = y¡C. Also, for later reference,
de…ne l^(S) as the solution to,
ul(f (K; 1¡ l^(S); µ); l^(S))
uc(f (K; 1¡ l^(S); µ); l^(S))
= (1¡ ¼n(S))fn(K; 1¡ l^(S); µ):
Notice that l^ is the amount of leisure that is compatible with utility max-
imization if everything today is currently invested. In general, the amount
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of consumption is less than f and leisure, which is positively related to con-
sumption, is therefore less than l^(S). This establishes a useful upper bound
on output in any state which in the sequel we will use to de…ne a candidate
set of consumption functions.
Now consider de…ning the following function l¤(c;K; µ) implicitly in the
…rst order condition (5)
ul(c; l¤(c;K; µ))
uc(c; l¤(c;K; µ)
= (1¡ ¼n(S))fn(K; 1¡ l¤(c;K; µ); K; µ):
Under Assumptions 6 and 7, one can easily establish that l¤(c;K; µ) is de-
creasing in c and increasing in K: Given a candidate equilibrium function
c(S); we rewrite the Euler equation (6) in equilibrium using l¤ as follows,
uc(c; l
¤(c;K; µ)) = ¯
Z
£
uc(c(Fc ¡ c; µ0); l¤(c(Fc ¡ c; µ0); K 0; µ0))r(Fc ¡ c; µ0)Â(µ; dµ0)
where Fc = f(K; 1 ¡ l¤(c(K; µ); K; µ); µ) + (1¡ ±)K: We then use this last
equation to de…ne a nonlinear operator that yields a strictly positive …xed
point in the space of consumption functions. This …xed point is an equilib-
rium for the economy.
De…ne F u(S) = F u(K; µ) = f(K; 1¡ l^(K; µ); µ) + (1¡ ±)K and the space
H of functions h : S! R such that:
(i) h is continuous,
(ii) h(S) 2 [0; F u(S)];
(iii) uc(h(S); l¤(h(S); S)) is decreasing in h;
(iv) uc(h(S); l¤(h(S); S)) is decreasing in K:
Equip H with the sup norm. Note that the assumption the marginal
utility of consumption is decreasing in h means that the spaceH di¤ers from
the space of consumption functions studied in Coleman [15]. It is easily
veri…ed that for the preferences considered in this model, the restriction uc
decreasing in h is implied. However, since the class of preferences studied
in this paper is larger than that studied in Coleman, additional restriction is
necessary on the space of consumption functions.
De…ne the mapping Z : H£Y £K£ Z! R where Y ½ R+; as
Z(h; ³;K; µ) = ª1(³;K; µ)¡ª2(h; ³;K; µ) (7)
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where
ª1 = uc(³; l
¤(³;K; µ));
and
ª2 = ¯
Z
£
uc(h(F³ ¡ ³; µ0); l¤(h(F³ ¡ ³; µ0); F³ ¡ ³; µ0))r(F³ ¡ ³; µ0)Â(µ; dµ0):
Here F³ = f (K; 1¡l¤(³;K; µ)+(1¡±)K: Then de…ne the nonlinear operator
A : H!H0 as follows:
Ah(K; µ) = f³ such that Z(h; ³;K; µ) = 0; h > 0;Ah(K; µ) = 0 elsewhereg
where H0 will be shown below to be exactly H:
Proposition 21 Under Assumptions 6-8, for any h 2 H, there exists a
unique Ah = ~h such that Z(h; ~h;K; µ) = 0; for any (K; µ):
Proof: Consider a given h 2 H and (K; µ) 2 S: Notice …rst that F~h ¡ ~h
is decreasing in ~h from the fact that N = 1 ¡ l¤(~h;K; µ) is decreasing in
~h. Given Assumption 6 and Assumption 8 (ii), the second term in Z in (7)
is strictly increasing in ~h since h is such that uc(h(K; µ); l¤(h(K; µ); K; µ))
is decreasing in K. Also, under Assumption 6 (iii), the …rst term in Z in
(7) is strictly decreasing in ~h, so Z is strictly decreasing in ~h. Assumption
6 (ii) implies that as ~h 7! f , the second term in Z approaches in…nity,
while the …rst term remains …nite. As a consequence, Z tends toward ¡1:
Likewise, under Assumption 6 (ii), as ~h! 0, the …rst term of Z approaches
1 while the second term remains …nite, therefore Z !1. Therefore given
continuity assumptions on preferences and distorted prices, ~h exists and is
unique. Continuity implies that Ahn ! Ah if hn ! h:
Our setup is more general than Greenwood and Hu¤man [25], which only
consider the case where ucl = 0; and Coleman [15], which allows for ucl ¸ 0
and also some cases where ucl < 0 but considers a restricted homothetic class
of preferences and imposes more restrictions (jointly on utility, production
functions and distortions) to study the case of negative cross partials of u.
The same case of negative cross-partials of u can be handled in our setting
also. At this stage, we are unable to capture more general cases of negative
cross partials of u than Coleman [15], therefore, we focus only on the ucl ¸ 0
case. We have the following important result:
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Theorem 22 Under Assumptions 6-8, Ah 2 H:
Proof: Under the continuity assumptions on preferences, technologies,
and distorted prices, continuity of Ah is obvious. Also it is straightfor-
ward that Ah belongs to the interval [0; F u(K;µ)]; otherwise the equality,
Z(h;Ah;K; µ) = 0, cannot be met since the second term in Z is not de…ned.
To prove that Ah 2 H; we need to check two more properties of Ah: First,
consider h2 ¸ h1; with (h1; h2) 2 H2. We show uc(Ah; l¤(Ah;K; µ)) is
decreasing in Ah; i.e. that uc(Ah2; l¤(Ah2; K; µ)) · uc(Ah1; l¤(Ah1; K; µ)):
De…ne ~h1 = Ah1 such that Z(h1; Ah1; K; µ) = 0 and ~h2 = Ah2 such that
Z(h2;Ah2; K; µ) = 0: Recall that,
ª2(h; ~h;K; µ) = ¯
Z
£
uc(h(F~h ¡ ~h; µ0); l¤(h(F~h ¡ ~h; µ0); F~h ¡ ~h; µ0))r(F~h ¡ ~h; µ0)Â(µ; dµ0);
(8)
where F~h = f(K; 1¡l¤(~h;K; µ); µ)+(1¡±)K: Since h2 is inH, ª2(h2; ~h2; K; µ)
· ª2(h1; ~h1; K; µ): That is, ª2 is decreasing h: Since ª1 is independent
of h; the solution ~h2 must be such that ª1(~h2; K; µ) · ª1(~h1; K; µ): Or,
uc(Ah2; l
¤(Ah2; K; µ)) · uc(Ah1; l¤(Ah1; K; µ)); for all (K; µ): This veri…es
that uc(Ah; l¤(Ah;K; µ)) is decreasing in Ah:
Finally, to complete the proof we need to show that Ah is such that
uc(Ah(K; µ); l
¤(Ah(K; µ); K; µ)) is decreasing in K: We show that for any
K2 ¸ K1; uc(~h2; l¤(~h2; K2; µ)) · uc(~h1; l¤(~h1; K1; µ)) where ~h1 = Ah1 for
(K1; µ) and ~h2 = Ah2 for (K2; µ); that is, Z(h1; ~h1; K1; µ) = 0 and Z(h2; ~h2; K2; µ) =
0: Note that, F~h ¡ ~h is increasing in K; since l¤(~h;K; µ) is decreasing in
K; the marginal products of capital and labor are positive and also by As-
sumption 8 (ii) r is decreasing in K. From equation (8), ª2(h1; ~h1; K2; µ) ·
ª2(h1; ~h1; K1; µ) and from the de…nition of Z,ª2(h1; ~h1; K1; µ) = ª1(~h1; K1; µ):
Also, l¤(~h;K; µ) decreasing in K and ucl ¸ 0 imply that ª1(~h1; K2; µ) ·
ª1(~h1; K1; µ): Therefore, as K increases both ª1 and ª2 decrease. Using
the fact that ª1(~h2; K; µ) · ª1(~h1; K; µ); for all (K; µ);demonstrated above
we get,
ª1(~h2; K2; µ) · maxfª1(~h1; K2; µ);ª2(h1; ~h1; K2; µ)g · ª1(~h1;K1; µ);
which veri…es uc(~h2; l(~h2; K2; µ)) · uc(~h1; l(~h1; K1; µ)):
Notice that H is a non-empty, convex subset of a space of continuous,
bounded real-valued functions but is not compact. We de…ne the following
29
subset of H denoted by ¹H to be the set of functions h 2 H such that
0 ·j h(K2; µ)¡ h(K1; µ) j·j F (K2; l¤(h(K2; µ); K2; µ)¡ F (K1; l¤(h(K1; µ); K1; µ) j
for all K2 ¸ K1: A standard argument shows that the space of consumption
functions ¹H ½ H is a closed, pointwise compact, and equicontinuous set of
functions. Then by a standard application of Arzela-Ascoli, ¹H is a compact
order convex, order interval inH. Notice that the restriction on consumption
in the space ¹H that distinguishes it from H implies that the investment
function K 0 = Fh ¡ h is an increasing functions of the current capital stock
K which follows because Fh is increasing in K (since l¤ is decreasing in K;
the marginal products of capital and labor are positive).
We now de…ne the standard pointwise partial order on H as follows:
h0 ¸ h if h0(S) ¸ h(S) for all S 2 K££, and we adopt the same order on
the subspace ¹H. We have the following results:
Lemma 23 ¹H is a complete lattice.
Proof: The interval topology on a partially order set X is that topology
that has the property that each closed set is either X, the empty set, or
can be represented as the intersection of sets that are …nite unions of closed
intervals in X. A lattice X is complete if every subset set of X has a sup.
Frink [24] shows that a lattice is compact in its interval topology i¤ it is a
complete lattice. The converse is shown in Birkho¤ [11]. Notice that ¹H is
compact in its interval topology. Therefore it is a complete lattice.
Proposition 24 Ah 2 ¹H: Furthermore, under assumption 6-8, A is mono-
tone on H.
Proof: We previously established that Ah 2 H; and it simply remains
to show that for all K2 ¸ K1 :
0 ·j Ah(K2; µ)¡ Ah(K1; µ) j·
·j F (K2; l¤(Ah(K2; µ); K2; µ)¡ F (K1; l¤(Ah(K1; µ); K1; µ) j
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Consider anyK2 ¸ K1: SinceAh 2 H;ª1(Ah(K2; µ); K2; µ) · ª1(Ah(K1; µ); K2; µ):
But then:
ª2(h;Ah(K2; µ); K2; µ) · ª2(h;Ah(K1; µ);K2; µ) · ª2(h;Ah(K1; µ); K1; µ)
for a solution at Z = 0: This requires that:
0 ·j Ah(K2; µ)¡ Ah(K1; µ) j·j F (K2; l¤(Ah(K2; µ); K2; µ)¡ F (K1; l¤(Ah(K1; µ); K1; µ) j
To demonstrate monotonicity, consider h0 ¸ h; (h; h0) 2 H2. Note that uc
is strictly decreasing in h, so that the second term in Z;ª2; is decreasing in
h, while the …rst term, ª1; is independent of h. Also, Z(h;Ah;K; µ) = 0 by
de…nition of the operator A therefore Z(h0; Ah;K; µ) ¸ 0. Z is decreasing in
its second argument by Assumptions 6 (i), 7 (ii) and 8 (ii), hence the solution
Ah0 must be such that Ah0 ¸ Ah:
Proposition 25 Under Assumptions 6-8, among the set of …xed points of A :
¹H! ¹H there exists a maximal …xed point h¤ 2 ¹H such that limn!1AnF !
Ah¤ = h¤; uniformly. Further, the maximal …xed point is strictly positive (
h¤ > 0):
Proof: The …rst result (existence and convergence) follows from the fact
that ¹H is complete and A is a monotone self map of ¹H. Note AF · F
and A0 ¸ 0; therefore by application of Tarski’s theorem the operator A has
a …xed point. In addition, because A is continuous, AnF converges to a
maximal …xed point Ah¤ in the set HI = fh j h 2 ¹H; h · Fg, and since S
is compact, the convergence in uniform. The second property (positivity)
follows from an obvious modi…cation of the main theorem in Greenwood and
Hu¤man [25].
Uniqueness of equilibrium can be established through an argument re-
lated to that in section 2 of the paper. Simplifying the notation by writ-
ting fu(K; µ) = f (K; 1 ¡ l^(K;µ); µ), we de…ne the set M of functions m :
K££! K such that:
(i) m is continuous;
(ii) 0 · m(K; µ) · 1
uc(fu(K;µ);l^(K;µ))
for K > 0; m(K; µ) = 0 for K = 0;
(iii) r(K
0;µ)
m(K0;µ) <
r(K;µ)
m(K;µ)
for K 0 > K:
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The space M can be interpreted as the space of the reciprocal of the
marginal utility functions. Our argument consist in de…ning a suitable op-
erator on the space M, showing that it has a unique strictly positive …xed
point, and relating the …xed points of the new operator to the old operator
Ah: De…ne the function H(m;K; µ) for each m 2 M implicitly as follows
(the following lemma makes sure that this de…nition is meaningful),
uc(H(m(K; µ); K; µ); l(H(m(K; µ); K; µ); K; µ)) =
1
m(K;µ)
;m > 0; and H(m;K; µ) = 0; m = 0:
Note that then H(m(K; µ);K; µ) = h(K; µ) pointwise.
Lemma 26 The mapping H(m;K; µ) is well-de…ned for each (m;K; µ):
Proof: Asm! 0; H(m;K; µ)! 0;for all (K; µ) and asm! 1
uc(fu(K;µ);l^(K;µ))
, H(m;K; µ) ! f (K; 1 ¡ l^; µ): Also, note that H( 1
uc(c;l(c;K;µ))
; K; µ) = c; for
all (K; µ); and H is continuous. Therefore, H is well-de…ned.
To characterize H(m;K; µ); consider m0 ¸ m in the pointwise partial or-
der on M, and de…ne h2 = H(m0; K; µ) and h1 = H(m;K; µ). Notice that
m0 ¸ m implies h2 ¸ h1: We can now show that f(k; 1¡l(H(m;K; µ); K; µ))¡
H(m;K; µ) is decreasing in m by the de…nition of H(m;K; µ): Consider
¢(h; fh ¡ h; µ) = ¯
Z
uc(h(fh ¡ h; µ0); l(h(fh ¡ h; µ0); fh ¡ h; µ0))r(fh ¡ h; µ0)Â(µ; dµ0))
For m0 ¸ m; we have the following inequality
uc(Ah1; l(Ah1; K; µ) = ¢(h1; fAh1 ¡ Ah1; µ)
¸ ¢(h2; fAh1 ¡ Ah1; µ)
Therefore, for such a perturbation of h; the mapping Z used in the de…nition
of Ah is now nonnegative, and the …rst term in the de…nition of Z must
decrease and the second term must increase in a solution Ah2. The latter
implies fAh2 ¡ Ah2 · fAh1 ¡ Ah1: By the de…nition of H(m;K; µ); the
quantity f (K; 1 ¡ l(H(m;K; µ); K; µ)) ¡ H(m;K; µ) = fH(m) ¡ H(m) must
be decreasing in m: Since m0 and m where arbitrary, that completes the
proof of the claim.
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Following section 2, de…ne the mapping
Z^(m; ~m;K; µ) =
1
~m
¡ ¯
Z
£
r(f ~m ¡H( ~m;K; µ); µ0)
m(f ~m ¡H( ~m;K; µ); µ0)Â(µ; dµ
0); (9)
where fm ¡H(m;K; µ) = f(K; 1¡ l(H(m;K; µ); K; µ); µ) ¡H(m;K; µ) and
the associated operator A^ as:
A^(m) = f ~m 2M j Z^(m; ~m;K; µ) = 0; for m > 0; 0 elsewhereg
Lemma 27 The operator A^ is a well-de…ned self map.
Proof: Recall fm¡H(m;K; µ) is decreasing in m: Also that Z^ is strictly
increasing in m, and strictly decreasing in ~m: Also for …xed m > 0; K >
0; ~m ! 0 implies that Z^ ! ¡1: Similarly, as ~m ! 1
uc(f;l^(K;µ))
; Z^ ! 1:
Consequently there is a unique A^m for each m > 0; K > 0; all µ: Note also
that if K 0 > K; Z^(m; ~m;K 0; µ) > Z^(m; ~m;K; µ): Therefore, A^m(K 0; µ) >
A^m(K; µ); when K 0 > K: Since r decreasing in K; r
m
is decreasing in K:
Thus A^m 2M:
We can relate the orbits of the operator A^n to the operator An by the
following construction. Consider some h0 2 ¹H. For such an h0; there exists
an m0 = 1uc(h0;l(h0;K;µ)) 2M such that H( 1uc(h0;l(h0;K;µ))) = h0: By de…nition,
Z^(m0; A^m0; K; µ) = Z^(H(
1
uc(h0;l(h0;K;µ))
; K; µ); A^H( 1
uc(Ah0;l(Ah0;K;µ))
); K; µ) =
Z(h0;Ah0; K; µ): Therefore, h1 = Ah0 = H( 1uc(Ah0;l(Ah0;K;µ))) = H(A^m0): A
similar argument establishes Anh0 = H(A^nm0), for all n.
Lemma 28 A^ has a strictly positive …xed point.
Proof: We know that m = 0 is a …xed point of A^. To verify that A^
has strictly positive …xed points in M, consider the trajectory of A^ from
m0 =
1
uc(fu;l^(K;µ))
. It is easily veri…ed that 0 < A^m0 · m0: Compute
h0(K; µ) = H(m0(K; µ)) = H(
1
uc(h0;l(h0;K;µ))
) · H( 1
uc(fu;l^(K;µ))
): Notice that
h0(K; µ) is equal to an orbit of the operator Ah 2 ¹H; namely, it is the same
as Afu(K;µ). Therefore, h0 is the optimal plan associated with a one-
period distorted dynamic economy. Similar calculations show hn(K; µ) =
H(An¡1m0(K; µ)) is the optimal plan associated with a n-period economy.
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Since A and A^ are continuous, and they both map compact sets to com-
pact sets, h¤ = limn!1 hn(K; µ) = limn!1H(Anm0(K; µ)) 2 ¹H: Therefore
following an argument in Coleman [15], we can associate a value function
with each orbit Anfu which is strictly concave. Therefore h¤ > 0; and
m¤ = limn!1H(Anm0) > 0: So A^ has a strictly positive …xed point.
Finally, uniqueness of this strictly positive …xed point rests upon the
pseudo concavity and x0-monotonicity of the operator A^.
Theorem 29 Under Assumptions 6-8, h¤ > 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Proof: Since Z^ is increasing in m, and decreasing in ~m = A^m; A^m1 ¸
A^m2 for m1 ¸ m2: Also the Inada condition in Assumption 6 is su¢cient
for A^ to be K0-monotone (see Coleman [14], Lemma 9, 10), and a su¢cient
condition for pseudo-concavity is,
Z^(tm; tA^m;K; µ) > Z^(tm; A^tm;K; µ): (10)
which is always true sincem 2M; and r decreasing inK . Hence, Z^(tm; tA^m;K; µ) =
1
~m
¡¯ R
£
r(f ~m¡H(t ~m);µ0)
m(f ~m¡H(t ~m);µ0)Â(µ; dµ
0) > 0;and Z^(tm; A^tm;K; µ) = 0: Therefore by
Theorem 8 in Coleman ([14]), A^ has at most one strictly positive …xed point,
and therefore A has exactly one strictly positive …xed point (following teh
same argument as in Section 2).
5 Suggestions for Future Research
In this paper we have discussed how to construct competitive equilibrium
for a broad class of smooth, strongly concave in…nite horizon economies.
The method …rst restricts attention to continuous Markovian equilibrium.
In each case, one …rst constructs an closed and equicontinuous subset of
bounded continuous functions in the uniform topology. This is a compact
set in this topology, and in addition also a complete lattice. We then develop
various methods for establishing equilibrium for each parameter describing
the aggregate policy environment. Since our operators are all single valued,
we are able to use various versions of order based …xed arguments (either
based upon topological constructions or lattice based constructions) to es-
tablish equilibrium. Since equilibrium in each of our environments is unique,
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we can do strong comparative analysis in the sense of Milgram and Shannon
[35] in strong set orders.
What is critical in this environment is the role of strong concavity. When
the value function can be shown to be appropriately concave, the best re-
sponses of each agent is a single valued continuous mapping, and this greatly
simpli…es the analysis. If one relaxes the strict concavity property in com-
petitive environments, the methods have to be changed. The Euler equation
methods in Section two seem doomed, for once we lose strong concavity of
the value function, continuous selections no longer in general exist in the
best response mappings, and so Euler equations methods have little appeal.
Mirman, Morand, and Re¤ett [33] we study this case and show existence by
extending the value iteration methods of section three of this paper and apply
Zhou’s generalization of the theorem of Tarski (see Zhou [56]). Further when
using the so-called induced set order of Topkis [52], we are able to show that
monotone comparative analysis like that obtained in section three is once
again available. Having lost uniqueness, we are unable to provide strong
comparative analysis results like those discussed in Milgram and Shannon
[35].
Additionally, the methods could also prove very useful in studying dy-
namic games (for instance policy games between two countries). It is well
known that in such environments, even if return functions are assumed to be
strictly concave, the value functions for such dynamic games are generally
not even concave. While topological methods based upon single valued oper-
ators seem di¢cult to apply, the value function iteration methods of Section
3, however, appears very promising because the latter methods are based
upon supermodularity properties, and not concavity properties. For at least
the symmetric equilibrium case discussed in Sundaram [?], it would appear
that the methods in Mirman, Morand, and Re¤ett [33] might work. This
problem, and many others are now the subject for future research.
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